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In the Supren1e Court of the
State of Utah

THE VALLEY MORTUARY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

CASE NO. 7350

LIONEL FAIRBANKS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment
of the DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT after refusal to grant a jury upon due demand,"~
holding that a contract between the parties precluded the
defendant from performing funeral services in a specified
territory, awarding damages for past alleged breaches and
enjoining the defendant from performing services in said
territory in the future.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Under date of August 6, 1945, Lionel Fairbanks, defendant and appellant, doing business as Lionel Fairbanks
Mortuary, entered into an agreement with Aura C. Hatch,
acting for and on behalf of the Valley Mortuary, plaintiff
and respondent herein. This agreement was subsequently
modified as to paragraph five (5) thereof so that the agreement after its modification reads as follows (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") :
"AGREEMENT
This agreement made this 6th day of August, 1945,
by and between Lionel Fairbanks Mortuary of Eureka,
Utah, and · the V!alley Mortuary a Corpn. of Utah
County with main office at Provo, Utah.
Now, Therefore, the seller Lionel Fairbanks agrees
to furnish the Valley Mortuary buyer, with a Warranty deed for the Mortu~ry property in Eureka, with abstract brought up to date to the satisfaction of the
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork.
2. To furnish the buyer with a certificate of title, free
and clear, to t}?.e Buick Hearse mentioner in the inventory.
3. To furnish the buyer with a BILL o~F SAUE to the
mortuary equipement, caskets, supplies, and personal
property set forth in the attached inventory.
4. To deliver to the buyer possession of the premises
herein referred to, together with all the equipment,
fixtures, etc. as set out immediately on the signing of
this agreernent.
5. That the said sellar will not for a period of (25)
twenty five years, from the date of this contract, operate a mortuary or funeral business in Utah Co. Pro-
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vo & South of Provo or Juab Counties, in his own name
or through a subsidiary or third party.
6. The sellor agrees that all bills, accounts, and obligations and taxes incurred prior to August 6, 1945,
shall be paid by him.

jsj Lionel Fairbanks
LIONEL FAIRBANKS MO·RTUARY

jsj Aura C. Hatch
PRES. VALLEY MORTUARY"

Exhibit "A" also includes the inventory attached to the
contract, which itemized the following property, which was
to be conveyed under the agreement:
''IN·VENTORY AT THE FAIRBANKS MORTUARY,
EUREKA, UTAH

As of August 6th, 1945
CASKETS
1 State (Pink).

1

"

1

"
"
"
"
"
"

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
3
5

Choc}tlet
oct.
Red
Sil Rivera
Ore.
Mohogney P9l
Corduary Rose
Blue
"

"
Oct.
Tan
Lamb
2j0 White Lamb.
Rough Boxes

$95.00
77.00
95.00
95.00
95.00
87.50
187.50
54.00
54.00
65.00
37.00
35.00
23.25
40.00
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FURNI'IURE & FIXTURES

/

..

Drapes and Curtains
Underwood Typewritter
1 Electric Heater
1 Uawn Mower
2 Ash Trays on Stands
1 Monkey Stove
1 Heater
19 Plain Chairs
1 Mohar Divan
1 Lether Divan
8 Other c•hairs
1 Roletop Desk & Chair
1 Library Table
3 9-12 rugs
·2 Coffee Tables
1 Center table
3 Floor Lamps
1 . Table Lamp
1· Hall Tree
SUPPLIES
184 Bottles Embalming Fluid.
2 · Mens Suits
2
Womens Dresses
\
1
Womens Slippers
.1- L D S Garment
1

Buick Hearse

1935

· 1 · Ca.sket vail
1
Frigid Lowering Device
Set Green grave drapes
1
1 Metal Emb. Table /
1
Metal Stre-tcher

. ·1· . ~xx:xxx:·

u·

1 . ·Vigial Lamp
· , a Crucifix ·
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Set Embalming Inst.
Make up Kit.
2 Church Trucks
2 Display "
28 Sheets
2 Pillow slips"

1
1

On or about the month of September, 1945, Lionel Falrbanks approached Aura C. Hatch, president and manager
of the Valley Mortuary, and told Mr. Hatch that Fairbanks
wanted to build a mortuary or funeral home in Orem or
American Fork, and Hatch, in his own handwriting, added
by interlineation in paragraph five (5) of such agreement,
after the words "mortuary or funeral business in Provo,
Utah" the words "co. and south of Provo" so that paragraph
five (5) of the agreement, after the interlineation, is as
shown above.
Lionel Fairbanks built a mortuary or funeral home in
Orem about seven (7) miles north of the north city limits
of Provo, Utah, (Tr. 16) and began operation thereof on
December 22, 1946 (Tr. 16). Thereafter Fairbanks picked
up bodies in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo and
in Juab County and conducted funerals in these localities,
particularly in the city of Eureka in Juab County (Tr. 18,
19, 33). Fairbanks operated only one establishment where
some funerals were held, and all of the bodies were embalmed, and that establishment was in Orem, seven (7)
miles North of Provo (Tr. 63).
Almost two (2) years after Fairbanks ·began the operation of his funeral business in Orem, Valley Mortuary in
August of 1948 instituted an action in the Fourth Judicial
District Court against appellant Lionel Fairbanks, claiming
violation of the contract, plaintiff's Exhibit "A." The words
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of the complaint, eliminating the
lows:

form~l

·parts, are as fol-

"Comes now the plaintiff and for cause of action
against defendant alleges:
·
1. That the plaintiff now is and at all of the times
hereinafter mentioned has been a corporation duly organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah, with its principal place of business at Provo,
Utah.
2. That the defendant Lionel Fairbanks now is .
and at all of the times herein mentioned has been a
resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and now is
doing business in Utah County as the Lionel Fairbanks
Mortuary.
3. That prior to the 6th day of August, 1945,
defendant was operating and conducting a mortuary
and funeral business in Juab and Utah Counties, with
his principal place of business at Eureka, Utah. That
on or about the said 6th day of August, 1945, plaintiff
and defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby
the plaintiff promised and agreed to pay defendant the
sum of Five Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars
($5,500), for and in consideration of the defendant
agreeing to perform certain conditions on his part, the
terms of which were to be incorporated into a written
agreement, which written agreement was made and entered into on the said 6th day of August, 1945, a copy .
of which agreement follows:"
(Thereafter there is set out the contract (plaintiff's Ex- ··
h~bit '.'A") , except paragraph 5 of the contract as shown in
the complaint was quoted somewhat incorrectly as follows:)
'5. That the said sellar will not for a period of
. _(25)) twenty five years, froin the date of this contract,
-operate a mortuary or funeral business in Provo, Utah
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and in Utah County south of Provo, or Juab County,
in his O\vn name or through a subsidiary or third party.'
4. That in consideration of the foregoing written promises made by defendant and in reliance thereon, plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of Five Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500).
5. That the defendant performed the conditions
of the agreement as above set forth except that de..
fendant, shortly after the signing of said agreement
and the payment to him by plaintiff of the sum of Five
Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500), began
operating a mortuary and funeral business in Provo
and in the area south of Provo in .Utah County and in
Juab County in his own name, in that he solicits and
procures customers in those places and holds funerals
there.
6. That by reason of the breach of said contract
by defendant and the operatian of a mortuary and funeral business in Provo and in Utah County south of
Provo and in Juab Cotinty, plaintiff's business has been
therPby lessened and damaged to plaintiff's injury in
the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000) _Dollars.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment:
1. That the Court issue a permanent injunction
and restraining order enjoining the defendant and his
agents and assigns from operating or conducting a
mortuary or funeral business in Juab County and in
Provo City and in that of Utah County south of Provo City until August 6th, 1970.
2. For the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20)000) damages.
_3. For the costs of this suit and such other and
further relief as to the Court may seem equitable and
just."
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:qefe.nd~nt d~murred

to . ~~e .complai!1t. on the ground
t~a.t the tompiaJJ:i~ dia riot state facts sUfficient, to .constitute a caus.e·o_( action against the ·d~ffendant.. The.l?emurr~r:.was overruled. Thereupon the defendant filed his Answer which, eliminating the formal parts, is as follows:
~'Comes

now the defendant in the. above entitled
. action,- and without waiving the Demurrer heretofore
·filed h~rein, by way of Answer, to the. complaint of the
pl~inti~r,' admits, denies,, and alleges as· follows:
·1. Replying. to Paragraph 1 of ·plaintiff's Com_plaint, defendant admits the same.
·
~

· 2.· Replying to paragraph 2 of plaintiff's Complaint, defendant admits the same.
. ' 3~ Replying to paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Com.'pla.int, defendant admits the same, excepting that de. : fert:dant. alleges that paragraph No.. 5 of said alleged
. wtitten agreement read and reads as follows:
. 'That the said seller will not for a period of (25)
twenty five years; from the date of this contract, operate a mortuary or funeral business in Utah County,
··Provo and South or in Juab Counties, in his own name
· : .:or ·through a subsidiary or ·third party.'
........ In. addition thereto, the said agreement had at_:,· · tiiched, :·and: has attached, an inveritory of the property
sold, other than the mortuary building and lot itself.
.

4. Answering paragraph 4, defendant admits that
,··;the .. plai.ntiff corporation· paid $5.,500.00, pursuant to
~~.,· tb~ .terms {)f the .. &greement; .. but not. havipg infOl1lUl_- ··:·tlcui.With which to form a belief as to the truth or.falc~·::·~·&ity. 'of ,the. ·~lleg9:tio'n contained. in the balance of said
:: :;.·~:P~ra~rapp;~ · the .def~ndan.t denies the ~arne.
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5. Answering paragraph 5, the defendant admits
that he performed on his part the conditions of the
agreement, set forth therein; but denies the allegation in said paragraph to the effect that defendant,
after the signing of the agreement and the payment
of the $5,500.00, began operating a mortuary or funeral business in Provo, Utah and in Uitah County, South
of Provo and in Juab County; but alleges as an affirmative matter that he began operating a mortuary
and funeral business in Orem, Utah, located approxinlately five (5) miles north of Provo, and that he has
an investment of approximately $75,000.00 in such
business. Defendant admits that he has served patrons who have resided in Provo and in parts of Utah
County, south of Provo and in parts of Juab County,
and has performed isolated services in connection with
funerals held therein; but denies the balance of said
paragraph, and denies specifically that he has at any
time since said agreement was entered into operated
a mortuary andjor funeral business in Provo or in
the area south of Provo o:r in Juab County.
6. Answering paragraph 6,
the same and the whole thereof.

th~

defendant denies

7. Defendant denies each and every other material allegation contained in plaintiff's complaint, not
heretofore admitted, modified or denied.
By way of further defense and as an affirmative
matter, defendant alleges as follows:
(a) That Aura C. Hatch, president of the plain·
tiff corporation, at about the time referred to in plaintiff's complaint, prepared the alleged agreement and
signed the same on behalf of said corporation, and at
the time of its preparation and execution it was the
understanding and intent of the defendant and plaintiff and its officers and agents and president that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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:said . agreement should ~nd· did _,provide . that.· the defendant. should. not maintain· a· building ~r other:physical es~bl.ish]Jlent for a mortuary b~siness. in Provo,
....Utah. in Utah County South of Provo, or in·Juab Coun. ty; but defendant ·alleges· that it was not at that titne
or at any time, the intent of the parties or tl:leir understanding, and that the agreement does not provide that
the defendant .could not condu~t funerals within .said
territory or. serve patrons therein residing, or accept,
.. solicjt, or perform services therein.
Defendant further alleges that the tangible
property··conveyed pursuant to the terms of the agree.ment, consisting of the mortuary building and lot and
.. · the .funeral equipment, including the hearse, was, at the
·. time it was conveyed, of a reasonable and fair value of
at least $5,500.00; and that to require the defendant
not 'to·: accept business in Provo; and in Utah County,
· South or' Provo or in Juab County, would not be fair
. ·and would be arbitrary and unconscionable and not
within the terms of the alleged agreement. ·
·(b)

(c) . Defend~nt further alleges that to require
=· · -the defendant to refuse business in or from Provo, and
in :Utah County South of Provo and in Juab County,
. ,. w9~ld be arbit~ary and unfair an<;]. in unreasonable re",_ :straint of trade and injurious to the public welfare.
·wHEREFORE defendant prays that the Com... plaint of the plaintiff be dismissed."
'·
~

. The plaintiff demurred to the defendant's Answer and
f <bsequently waived his Demurrer. · ·The plaintiff also filed
~ ·\.fotio·n to Strike ana a Motion for Judgrrient on the pleadir/is. Th·e. Motion for Judgmel)t. on the pleadings was den~:~d1_.· ·.anq· the. :J(laiJ1tiff .~ubseq~~ntly · waived his· Motion to
s~rjk~~--

..
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Defendant duly and timely demanded that the matter
be tried by a jury (Tr. 3-7). The right to jury trial was
by the court denied and the matter was heard before the
court over the objection of the defendant (Tr. 3-7). The
court, in making this ruling, stated as follows:
THE COURT: "The Court, of course, indicated
its conception of the law respecting the significance of
the prayer of the complaint to be as supported by the
authority tnat Judge Young cited, that it isn't part
of the allegation, but it may be looted to to determine
the nature of the relief sought.. There is an allegation
of acts which the plaintiff contends are being carried
on at the present time, which the plaintiff contends
are in violation of the contract, and there is an implication of it being on occasions of more than one, at any
rate: Solicits, and procures, customers in those places
and holds funerals therein. The reasonable interpretation being that there be numerous, at least exceeding one such act.
The Court conceives in light of the prayer for the
relief the paramount object of the proceeding is injunctive, that there is an allegation of violation which presently continues, and where that's supported -by the reference to the answer of the defendant, claiming a right
to that, because to enforce the plaintiff's interpretation
of the contract would result in unlawful restraint of
trade; that in view of such matter, the question is primarily equitable, that the damage action or the damage claimed in this respect, to the matter, is incidental
to the primary relief; it being primarily equitable in thrCourt's mind, the parties are not entitled as a right_ tt
a jury to try the cause. And in as much as no jury'i
presently in attendance and this is the day set and .iz
appearing, at any rate, that very likely if the _questioJ
had been raised prior to this date, the Court may hav- ·
refused the application for a jury, it is now ordere 1
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that the .application be. rejected and that the clerk
return to the defendant the fee heretofore paid for the
jury.
You will want to make your exception to that?
MR. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON: "Yes. If the
Court please, the ruling is not based upon the fact that
a jury was not timely demanded, as I understand?~. The
record shows that?"
· THE COURT: ·"No, I make no point of that. Mrs.
~arter was checking that and I understood that the
fee was paid. I think the record may show that the
. fee was paid in advance of the setting date and in con- ·
formance with the rule of the court, which places the
question entirely upon the discretion of the Court and
its interpretation of the cause as an equitable action
primarily, so that the record is clear.''

MR. -SHERMAN CHRISTENSON: ''Then the de. fendant excepts to the ruling of the Court denying the
defendant's right to a trial by jury pursuant to his de. mand; and' also excepts to the holding that this is primarily an equitable action and not- primarily a law action; and that no jury is obtainable as a matter of
· right. And further excepts to the ruling of the Court
denying the request for--a jury setting." (Tr. 6, 7, 8).
The matter was thereafter heard before the Court
which 1n its· F'il1dings of Fact assumed to determine that
p~ainti~f· had
damaged in the amount of Seven Hundre,~ Fifty and N·OjlOO ($750.00) Dollars by defendant for
breach of. the. contract, and found .with respect to certain
funerals held by the defendant in Provo, and in Utah County south of Proyo and ~n Juab County, that there had been
a::- ·.violB.tion~
.. ~The ·Court, of course, found that the contract
.
..
ha.d been .exeGq.ted between the parties.
.

.

•,

•

-

·,

.

'

.•·,

I

.

been

-

'·..

r',

'

..

'
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The Conclusions of 4\w herein are very interesting,
and, eliminating the formal parts, are as follows:
"1. That on the 6th day of August, 1945, plaintiff
and defendant entered into a contract whereby the defendant agreed, for a valuable consideration paid to
him by plaintiff, that he would not, for a period of
twenty-five years from that date, operate a mortuary
or funeral business in Utah County or Juab County;
that said contract was not and is not in restraint of
trade and its terms are definite and certain.
2. That the contract dated August 6, 1945, was
later modified so as to exclude the area north of Provo
in Utah County from its terms.
3. That the defendant, in going to P~ovo and
there obtaining and accepting the dead bodies of those
who at the time of their deaths were residents of the
area north of Provo in Utah County and thereafter
transporting said bodies into Provo and into Utah
County south of Provo and into Juab County for funeral services and burial did not violate the terms of
the contract mentioned in paragraph "1" hereof.
4. That defendant, in going to Provo and into
the area south of Provo in Utah County and into Juab
County and there receiving and accepting the bodies
of deceased who at the time of their death were either·
residents of Provo or of the area south of Provo in
Utah County or of Juab -County, violated the terms of
the contract in that in so doing he engaged in the funeral business in said area.
5. That defendant, in conducting funeral services
and burials in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo and in Juab County, when he had not prepared those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bodies· .for burial violated the terms of the ·contract in
that in so doing he engaged in the funeral business in
&aid area.
6, That plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of this
Court in the sum of $750.00 damages and for its costs
herein expended.''

After making and entering his Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of·Law, the Court, eliminating the formal parts,
decreed as follows:
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that
the defendant, Lionel Fairbanks, his attorneys, agents,
servants and employees, is and are hereby restrained
and enjoined until August 6, 1970, from engaging in or
performing any of the following business or functions
within the area of Provo City and in Utah County south
of Provo City and in Juab County, to-wit:
From operating a mortuary therein.
2~ From accepting or receiving any body for
preparation and burial in cases where, at the time of
death, the deceased was a resident of such area .
1.

.3. From conducting funerals and burials where
the body has been prepared for burial at a mortuary
_not _o\yned and operated by the defendant.
4. - From advertising that he is conducting a mor.tuary establishment or doing a funeral business.
5. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed
--that plaintiff _have and recover from said defendant,
Lionel Fairbanks, the sum of $750.00 as damages together with its costs herein expended."
It is from this decree that the plaintiff appeals.
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT
AND APPELLANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL OF
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE OOURT
BELOW.
1. The Court erred in holding that the complaint stated facts sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to grant
equitable relief.
2. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the right
to have the case tried by a jury.
3. The Court erred in interpreting the contract to
mean that the appellant should be prohibited from conducting funeral services and performing other isolated services
in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo, and in Juab
, County.
4. The Court erred in refusing to receive testimony
of the value of the mortuary or funeral home operated by
appellant, Lionel Fairbanks, in Orem, Utah County, Utah.
5. The Court erred in striking the testimony of the
appellant,_ Fairbanks, to the effect that Mr. Jex, Treasurer.
of the Valley Mortuary, after the agreement was entered
into between the plaintiff corporation and defendant, Fair..
banks, came to Orem to approve the loan on behalf of the
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, in which bank he was
an officer, and in refusing the proferred testimony with
respect to Mr. Fairoanks' conversation with Mr. Jex.
6. The Court erred in rejecting the proferred testimony that the value of the tangible property sold under the
agreement herein by appellant to respondent was at least
Fifty Five Hundred and NOjlOO ($5,500) Dollars, the contract price.
7. The Court erred in making and entering its Finding of Fact No. 3.
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The Court .erred in making and entering its Conof Law No. 1.
The Court erred in making and entering its Conof Law No. 3.
10. The Court erred in making and entering its Conclusion of Law No. 4.

8.
clusion
9.
clusion

11. The Court erred in making and entering its Conclusion of Law No. 5.-

12. The Court erred in making and entering its Conclusion of La_w No. 6.
13. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant
should be enjoined from accepting or receiving any body
for preparation or burial in cases where at the time of
death, the deceased was a resident of Provo City or of Utah
County south of Provo, or in Juab County.
14. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant
should be enjoined and restrained from conducting burials
in Provo City or Utah County south of Provo, or in Juab
County, where the body was prepared for burial at a mortuary not owned and operated by the defendant.
15. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant
should be enjoined from advertising in Provo, or in Utah
County south of Provo or in Juab County, that he is conducting a mortuary establishment or doing a funeral business.
16. The Court erred- in ordering, adjudging and decreeing that the plaintiff_ recover judgment against the defendant in the sum of $750.00, together with his costs expended.
17. The Court erred in djsregarding the testimony of
witnesses of the defendant that they would not have given
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their ftmeral work to the Valley Mortuary even though the
services of the appellant Fairbanks were not available.
18. The Court erred in interpreting the contract to
mean that the defendant had sold to the plaintiff corporation under the agreeement, his good will in addition to the
other property sold under the terms thereof.

STATElVIENT AND ARGUMENT UPON PARTICULAR
QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR DETERMINATION.
1. The Court erred in holding that the Complaint stated facts sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to grant
equitable relief.
The only allegation in the Complaint which plaintiff
claims might be a basis for equitable relief is quoted from
paragraph 5 as follows: ,
"That the defendant performed the conditions of
the agreement as above set forth except that defendant,
shortly after the signing of said agreement and the
payment to him by plaintiff of the sum of Five Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500), began operating a mortuary and funeral business in Provo and in
the area south of Provo in Utah ·County and in Juab
County in his own name, in that he solicits and procures customers in those places and holds funerals
there."
Paragraph 6 of the Complaint is quoted as follows:
"That by reason of the breach of said contract by
defendant and the operation of a mortuary and funeral
business in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo
and in Juab County, plaintiff's business has been thereby lessened and damaged to plaintiff's injury in the
sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars." (J. R. 3).
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Then follows the prayer for an injunction and damages.
The Court held, over the objection of the defendant,
that the question was primarily equitable and that he
should hear the matter without a jury and determine the
whole cause, including the matter of an injunction and the
question of damages. (Tr. pp. 6, 7, 8).
Justice Folland of the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah, in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company vs.
Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 Pac. 2d 1070, on page 1078, quoted
from 10 R. C. L. 372, what he stated was the rule, as follows:
"While it is true that a court of equity, having
once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, will retain it for
all purposes and administer complete relief, it is generally conceded, despite the existence of a few oppos-ing decisions; which may be characterized merely as
variants from the general rule, that in order to authorize relief which can be obtained in a suit at law there
must be some substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction, and if there is no equitable ground of jurisdiction
and the remedy sought can be as well obtained in an.
action at law, a court of equity cannot retain jurisdic. tion and grant· a purely legal remedy. Mere state.J
ments in a bill on which the chancery jurisdiction might
be maintained, but which are not proved, will not suffice to authorize a decree on such parts of the bill as,
if standing alone ,would not give the court jurisdiction, but to justify the retention of a cause not only
must some special and substantial ground of equitable
jurisdiction b~ alleged, but it must also be proved on
the hearing.'' . (Boldface type ours) .
See also: Wyoming Coal Sales Co. v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 610; 144 S. E. 410; 62 A. L. R 740;
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Norback vs. Board of Directors, etc., 84 Utah 514, 37 Pac.
2d 339; Goldthait vs. Lynch, et al, 9 Utah 186, 33 Pac. 699;
State ex rei, Hansen, et al vs. Hart, 26 U. 186, 72 Pac. 938;
Estay vs. Holdren, District Judge (Kans.), 267 Pac. 1098.
In a full examination of the complaint and all of the
pleadings, it is respectfully submitted that. there is no basis
for equitable cognizance. The plain statement in the present tense by plaintiff that shortly after the signing of the
agreement the defendant began operating a mortuary and
funeral business in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo and in Juab County in his own name, in that he_ solicit$
and procures customers in those places and holds funerals,
certainly is a statement of no fact showing a basis for equitable relief. From the whole complaint it would appear
that the action was primarily legal for damages. There is
no allegation to invoke equitable jurisdiction. There is no
statement of facts showing that the remedy at law was inedequate, nor was there any other statement of any other
fact to show that the action was primarily equitable. Such
facts should be stated. There is no showing in the complaint that the building and equipment in Eureka was ever
even retained by the plaintiff and that there was ever any
necessity for an injunction-nothing to show that the legal
remedy of damages was not adequate. For· th~: court to
tak~ equitable jurisdiction and decide the· case without a
jury, sufficient facts must be stated in the complaint to
justify the same. In fact, the plaintiff alleged specific dam ..
ages covering all the claimed wrongful acts of the defend..
ant, and there can be no other conclusion from the body
of the complaint but that those damages would. furnish it
full relief.
We submit that the issues based upon the complaint
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are primarily, and, indeed, solely legal. Vol. 3 of Bancroft
on Code Pleadings, page 2551, paragraph 1545, states:
"The Complaint must state all the facts essential
to a cause of action for equitable relief and more particularly the facts justifying an injunction. What must
be alleged in a particular case, of course, depends largely upon what is essential in a right of action in that
sort of case."
From an examination of the complaint, we certainly
cannot see how the Court could determine that the action
was primarily equitable and that there were sufficient facts
alleged upon which to base an injunction.
2. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the
right to have a trial by jury.

If the District Court were correct in holding that the
issues raised by the· complaint and answer established primarily an equitable action, then and only then under the
law had he the right to deny the defendant a jury trial.
The Court did deny such right to the defendant and based
its denial upon his holding that the action, based on plaintiff's complaint, was primarily equitable (Tr. 6, 7 & 8).
Justice Moffitt, speaking for the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Norback vs. Board of Directors of Church
Extension Society, 84 Utah 514, 37 Pac. 2d 339, at page
343, said:
"Where the issues are legal issues, the fact that
equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry into effect
the judgments based upon the legal issues, is not suf·
ficient to deprive either party of his right to have the
legal issu~ submitted to a jury."
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The same view is held .in the case of Morthner vs.
Laynes, (Calif.) 168· Pac. 2d 481; Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah
186, 129 Pac. 2d 568. See also: State ex rei Hansen vs.
Hart, 26 Utah 229, 72 Pac. 938. In this case the only basis
for equitable relief is the prayer, and the prayer is not part
of the complaint. The whole basis for the relief in the complaint is legal. It follows that the Court herein wrongfully·
denied the defendant the right to a trial by jury, and the
case should be remanded.
3.

The Court erred in the interpretation of the con-

tract.
The Court held that the contract (plaintiff's Exhibit
"A") was definite and certain, and that it meant that the
defendant had agreed not to conduct 'funerals and engage
in· other miscellaneous activities in Provo, Utah, and in
Utah County south of Provo and in Juab Count~. As may .
be seen by the Conclusions of Law quoted above, arid iii
Judgment Roll, page ·43, the Court concluded that the residence of a decedent governed as to· whether. or not the de- .
fendant could perform funerals in Provo and in the other
parts of the territory in question. The decree supported
the conclusions in ·this particular respect. ( J. R. 44~45) .
It is interesting to· note in examining the~ transcript of..
record \Vith respect to· the occasion when counsel for plain~
tiff was examining the defendant with respect to funerals
that had been 'held ·by defendant, as to the questions·that
\Vere asked~ In the case of the death of Lawrence Russell
Gren, a re~ident of ·Orem; who died in Utah Valley Hb~pital
in Provo, with funeral in Orem and burial in Provo,_.counsel apparently claimed a violation ·(Tr 27-28) The same
was the case of Susan Virginia Stokes, resident of Orem,
0:
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who died in the Utah Vally Hospital with funeral in Provo
(Tr. 28). The same was the case in connection with the
death of Lewis Wahlquist, a resident of Orem, who died in
Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, and who was buried in Eureka (Tr. 28-29).
Counsel apparently claimed no violation with respect
to the death of Arthur Lynn Boswell, a resident of Vineyard (near Provo) who died in Utah Valley Hospital, with
funeral held in Provo (Tr. 29-30).
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed a violation
with respect to Anna W. Maag, a resident of Orem who died
in Payson Hospital, with funeral in Orem and Burial in Provo (Tr. 40).
Counsel also apparently claimed violation with respect
to Thomas Fielding, a resident of Orem, who died in uttah
County Infirmary with burial in Orem and funeral in Orem
(Tr. 40).
The same was apparently the case with respect to the
death of Alice Diane Carter, a resident of Orem, who died
in Utah Valley Hospital at Provo, with funeral in Orem and
burial in Heber, Utah (Tr. 41, 42).
As an anomaly herein, counsel apparently felt there
was no violation in the case of Arthur Gilbert, Jr., a resident of Provo, who died in Salt Lake City, the funeral services conducted in Provo and burial in Murray, Salt Lake
County, Utah (Tr. 42).
Counsel apparently claimed a violation with respect
to the death of Charles Terry, a resident of Orem, who died
in the Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, the funeral services
in Orem and burial in Provo (Tr. 42-43) ~
Counsel also apparently claimed a violation with re·
spect to Lena Smith, a resident of Los Angeles, California,
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who died· at Uos Angeles; \vith funeraf in··Ettreka and ·burial·
in Springville, Utah (Tr. 43). ·
Counsel· also apparently claimed a violation with· .respect to La\vrence Russell--Rand, a resident of Orerh, who·
died in Provo and was buried in Orem (Tr. 46).
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed violation with
respect to Janice Sanstrom, a- resident of Provo, who died
in Orem and was buried in Provo (Tr. 50).
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed violation with
respect to Tim Allred, a resident- of Orem, who 9-ied ·'in Provo with burial in Orem ..
Col.msel apparently claimed no violation as to a person who died in France and was buried in Santaquin (Tr.
54) , and others where the body was not prepared· for burial
by the defendant (Tr. 54-55).
Of course, in a statement to the Court; .coufisel ad~ mitted that he may have been somewhat inconsistent his
questions in this respect, but stated that
because of his
desire not to be unfair to the defendant (Tr. 206).
The above is shown in detail to ex~mplify the rather
strained and far-fetched interpretation the Court gave __ the
contract in question. He apparently interpreted it that' the
defendant should not conduct funerals in Provo and in Utah . .
County south of Provo and in Juab County; but then ~olds ·_
that the contract meant that if people wer~ residents- or .places -north of· Provo, ·it- was all right to ·conduct" funerals
t~erein; to pick up bodies therein, and to supervise the burial·therein. If the Coirrt is right that the contract did nof-mean -that the defendant -should only n·ot operate a physi-:· ·
cal-establishment at Provo -or in ·utah CoLmty south· of·: ..
Provo and in. Juab County, ·then -we -submit' he ·>would be
wrong in saying that defendant was· not- 'in violation ··~wherf:'<

was·

.

in

.
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he conducted funerals in Provo and Utah County south of
Provo or in Juab County, even though the decedents were,
at the time of their deaths, residents of places north of Provo. The distinction is artificially drawn. Of course, the
Court attempts to avoid this rather anomalous situation by
saying in his memorandum decision that it would be unthinkable to hold that the defendant could not conduct
these funerals in the disputed area. It is unthinkable, in
our opinion, for the Court to jnterpret the contract arti..
ficially and in such a strained way as he has, when the contract, interpreted in the way we maintain is correct, would
be clear and unequivocal. The Court held the contract to
be clear and unequivocal; the only way it could be unequivo,.
cal would be to hold that it meant that the defendant would
not operate a physical establishment in Provo or in Utah
County south of Provo or in Juab County. Indeed,. it would
appear to be all the protection the plaintiff would need to
protect its business building in Eureka.
Let us consider the words about which the controversy
mainly has arisen. We quote again from paragraph 5 of
the contract (plaintiff' Exhibit ·"A") as follows:
"That the seller will not for a period of twenty five
25 years from the date of this contract, operate a mortuary or funeral business in Utah County, Provo and
South of Provo or in Juab Counties in his own name
or through a subsidiary or third party."
The New Century Dictionary, Volume 2, published by
Collier, gives the two main defihitions of operate other than
the manual act upon the body of a patient, they define it
as follows:
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"to be working, aet .effectively·, or exert force or.:.
_~flue~ce_ (as,-_ the same causes are operating today; .
a new spirit was operating among them.; etc)."
-It also gives the definition:
" to bring about, effect, or produce, and by action or the exertion of force or influence; also, to keep
(a machine, apparatus, factory, industrial system; etc.)
working or in operation; manage or use -(a machine,
etc.) at work.''
In discussing the definition of the word operate· there
are several interesting cases in the publication- \Vords andPhrases, among which is the case of State vs. Mahforez, ·
181 -Louisiana 183, 158 Southern.609. In that case it was
held that the word operate means _

"to bring about; to put into or continue an opera-_
tion or activity; to manage, to conduct; tq carry out or
through; to work, as to . operate a machine/' -~
·· ·;•_ -··
In the case Kornhauser vs. National Surety Co.; li4- ,_
Ohio St. 24, 150 N. E. 921-923, it was stated that in relation to the operation of a coal' bed, the word operate is . _
synonymous with occupy or- work. In discussing the case . .
the judgment says:"occupy is also held to be synonynious .with vvork .
or operate, in_ the primary and most familiar ·sense· of · ·
the word, occupy is the equivalent of the- word possess. It implies the_ conception of permanent· tenure- for a '
period of greater or less duration as ll:Sed in •- a· deed.
· In relation· to the operation of a coal bed, the word
occupy is. synonymous with the word work or _ope~~·"
.: ·The word mortuary is defined-as a "dead house,'".and···._.-.
the· Court has· determined there is no· question- about the ' operation of a mortuary.
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Business, in the same dictionary, is defined as follows:
~'The

state of being busy; also, that with which
one is busy or occupied; a matter of special concern at
a particular time; a particular mission; charge, purpose, etc.; something to be done or attended to; an affair in which one has the right to act or interfere, or
the right itself; any matter, affair, or thing as (This
is bad business; tired of the whole business) ; also a
matter of habitual concern or interest; one's occupation, profession, or trade; also, action which requires
time, attention and labor; serious employment as opposed to intercourse generally; esp., commercial dealings, mercantile pursuits collectively; trade, commercial transactions or engagements;· also, a commercial
enterprise or establishment."
The word funeral is defined as follows:
"Of or pertaining to the ceremonial burial (or,
sometimes, cremation) of the dead; used, spoken, etc.,
on such an occasion (as, funeral rites, a funeral sermon). The ceremonies connected with the disposition
of the body of a dead person; obsequies; also, a funeral
procession."
The Court will undoubtedly take judicial notice of the
fact that no one is exclusively in the business of conducting
funerals only. They als~ will take judicial notice of the
fact that mortuaries are very often known as funeral
homes.
We submit that the contract either refers to operating
a mortuary or funeral business as a physical establishment
or plant or it is ambiguous.
If it refers to the establishment itself, therein lies the
solution of this case. That is what defendant claims, but if
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it means to do any funeral business in the sense of the- picking up of bodies, receiving calls, etc., that is another thing.

It is not enough to say that. the contract definitely includes
some of the acts claimed by the plaintiff; the whole meaning is the thing in doubt. Does it mean receiving telephone
calls, taking the hearse to Eureka, responding to requests
of residents of Orem to go to ?rovo, taking a body from
out of the City of Provo? It is not enough to say that
there is no violation where the decedent is a resident of
Orem even though the death and burial is in Provo. ·That
is an artificial, strained construction by the Court.
There was an interesting Washington case recently .between Merlin et ux., vs. Rodine et ux, 203 Pac. 2d 683.
Here the Supreme Court held that a contract was not ambiguous, but in the course of its opinion states:
"We have consistently held that we cannot, upon
general principles of abstract justice, make a contract
for the parties that they did not make for themselves."
Here there would not even be principles of· abstract
justice in the contract the Court is attempting to make for
the parties.
We subm~t that the only way the contract could, be
unambiguous is to hold that the contract meant and
means that the defendant would not operate a _physical. establishment in Provo or in Utah County south of Provo
or Juab County, either in the nature of a ·mortuary itself
or a funeral business in connection with his home. Cer~
tainly one would not call his home from which 'he might
conduct his funeral business a mortuary. It is. certainly
unclear and equivocal that the contract meant only as the
Court found.
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To aid in the interpretation of this particular contract,
we would like to quote from 12 Am. Jr. 791, paragraph
250, which reads as follows:
"Agreements must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to the intention of the parties at the
time of executing them, if that intention can be ascertained from their language. In the transactions of
business life, sanity of end and aim is at least a pre-·
sumption, though a rebuttable one. A reasonable interpretation will be preferred to one which is unreasonable. When the evidence of the agreement furnished
by the contract itself is not plain and unmistakable,
but is open to more than one interpretation, the reason..
ableness of one meaning as compared with the other
and the probability that men in the circumstances of
the parties would enter into one agreement or the other are competent for consideration on the question as
to what the agreement was which the written contract
establishes. When the language of an agreement is
contradictory, obscure, or ambiguous, or where its
meaning is doubtful, so that it is susceptible of two
constructions, one of which makes it fair, customary,
and such as prudent men would naturally execute,
while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such
as reasonable men would not be likely to enter into, the
interpretation which makes a rational and probable
agreement must be preferred. The interpretation of
any instrument ought to be broad enough to allow
it to operate fairly and justly under all the conditions
to which it may apply. A court will not place an unjust interpretation upon a contract, unless the terms
thereof compel it to do so. An agreement will not be
interpreted so as to render it oppressive or inequitable
as to either party or so as to place one of the parties
at the mercy of the other, unless it is clear that such
was their intention at the time the agreement was
made. An interpretation which is just to both parties
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will be preferred to one which· is unjust. Every intendment is to be made against the interpretation of
a contract under which it would operate. as a snare.
The inconvenience, hardship, or absurdity of one interpretation of a contract or its contradiction of the
general purpose of the contract is weighty evidence
that such meaning was not intended when the langUage
is open to an interpretation which is neither absurd nor
frivolous and is in agreement with the general purpose
of the parties."
It does not seem that under the reasonable facts and
the reasonable circumstances of this case that the plaintiff
should be entitled to force the defendant to do . any
more than not maintain a physical establishment closer
than 57 miles from the mortuary building sold by defendant to plaintiff in order to protect the plaintiff.
The Court admitted testimony of Aura ·C. Hatch, president and manager of the plaintiff mortuary, that he prepared the contract in question (Tr. 192). It should have
been construed most adversely against the plaintiff instead
of most favorably to it, as its officer made the contract.
General Mills, Inc., vs. Cragun, et al, 102 Utah 239, 134
Pac. 2d 1089.
In this case part of the transcript of the deposition of
Aura C. Hatch, president of the plaintiff mortuary, which
deposition was taken January 28, 1949, was offered in evi-.
den~e for the purpose of showing what Hatch, when he
drew the contract, undoubtedly meant by operating a business. Hatch, in answer to the following questions, made
the following answers:
Where do you live, Mr. Hiatch? ·
A. 85 East 3rd South.

"Q.
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What is your business?
A. I am a mortician, president and general manager
of the Valley Mortuary.
Q. And is that a corporation, Mr. Hatch?
A. Corporation.
Q. Who are the other officers in the corporation?
A. LeRoy Johnson.
Q. What is his position?
A. He is the treasurer, William R. Jex, Secretary.
Walter M. Rigby, Vice President.
Q. Where does Mr. Johnson reside?
A. Here in Provo.
Q. Is he also a director?
A. Yes.
Q. And where· does Mr. Jex reside?
A. At Spanish Fork.
Q. Mr. Rigby?
A. Payson.
Q. How long have you been incorporated, Mr. Hatch?
A. Since 1943.
Q. And have you had the same officers during that
time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have your business here in Provo?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you operate at any other place?
A. Yes, we operate at Payson, and Eureka we have
a place." (Tr. 193-194). (Boldface ours).
Q.

The Court, we believe, erroneously sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony from the transcript of the deposition.
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It would be strange to say, would it not, that because
we;- as counsel, take a case down in Sanpete County that
we are operating our law business in Sanpete County, even
though the physical· plant of our office is located in Provo,
Utah. Certainly we are operating our law business in Provo, Utah, as an establishment or calling.
The defendant offered to show by the testimony of
Fairbanks that the tangible property specified in the contract, (plaintiff's Exhibit "A"), including the property inventoried upon the exhibit attached to the contract, was
of a reasonable money value in excess of Fifty F1ive Hun..
dred and NOjlOO ($5,500) Dollars. The Court declined
the offer. (Tr. 184). In interpretation oft the contract,
the Court certainly should have accepted the testimony
that the physical property conveyed itself was of a value
in excess of Fifty Five Hundred and NOjlOO Dollars. The
Court erred in refusing that testimony.
That testimony would not go to vary the terms of a
written instrument, but would show some of the surrounding circumstances, and would go to the reasonableness as
to whether or not the defendant would have executed such
a contract with the meaning that the Court has so artificially interpreted it to have.
The Court, in interpreting the contract, failed and refused to give any weight to the following testimony of Lionel Fairbanks, which was neither rebutted or denied:
Directing your attention to the time the contract
was changed by interlineation, did you have a conversation
with Mr. Hatch?
A. Yes, yes, I did.
Q. And will you state what was said?
"Q.
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A.

Well, I went to his home in Provo and told him
that I had decided to build a mortuary in Orem or American Fork, and that I would like the contract modified permitting me to build a mortuary there.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said, 'Well, I see no reason for you not building a mortuary in Orem. We don't have any places north
of Provo.' And we went into some detail about modifying
it and he said, 'Well, if we put it that you can't build a mortuary south of Provo would that be satisfactory, or Provo
and South?' And I said, 'That will be fine with me, Mr.
Hatch.' So he modified the contract.
Q. By the interlineation appearing in pen?·
A. Uh huh."
.Certainly after Hatch, who was negotiating for the
plaintiff corporation, had a_ conversation with respect to
where a mortuary might be built, the contract could not
have meant what the Court interpreted it to mean.
· Assignments of Error numbered 4, 5, and 6, we believe, will not require further separate treatment, other
than to say that the Court should have taken into consideration evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, testimony with respect to the value of
defendant's mortuary built in Orem, and testimony with
respect to the financing thereof after an appraisal by an
·officer of the Valley lVIortuary, should have been received.
(Tr. 65).
The Court should have received testimony with respect to the value of the tangible assets conveyed under
the contract, such value being in excess of $5,500 (Tr. 8089, 110-112).
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This testimony would go to the facts surrounding the
making of the contract, and should have been received by
the Court.
Assignments of Error numbered 7 to 16 inclusive are
all based upon whether or not the Court was correct in denying a jury trial to the defendant, and thereafter whether
or not he was correct in the interpretation of the contract.
If the Court erred, as we feel he did, in denying a jury trial
to defendant, and also erred in his interpretation of the contract, as we also feel he did, then there was error as to
the matters assigned No. 7 to 16 inclusive.
\

4. Tlie Court erred in disregarding the testimony of
witnesses of the defendant as to \V.hether or not they would
have given funeral work to tbe Valley Mortuary. In spite of the direct testimony of the defendant's wit-

nesses that even if the services of Lionel Fairbanks had not
been a~ailable they would not have given their funeral work
to The Valley Mortuary, the Court, in all but one instance,
disregarded it. (Judgment Roll, pages 35-36; Tr. 137-138,
148-149, 151-152, 155-156, 162, 164).
~

5. The Court erred in. interpreting the contract to include the sale of good will.

The contract (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") was prepared
by Aura C. Hatch, president of the Valley Mortuary (Tr.
192). He specified matters to be sold under the contract
and under the inventory. If good vlill were intended to
pass under the contract, we submit that the writer thereof
would have specified it. The fact that he failed to state
that the good will passed, and specified everything else that
did pass, should be, in our opinion, ample support for the
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view that good will did not pass. All that the defendant
agreed·was not to operate a physical establishment, a mortuary or funeral business in Provo and Utah County, south
of Provo, and in Juab County.
CONCLUSION

We submit that the Court erred in holding that the
case was primarily equitable, and in denying the defendant
a trial by jury. We further submit that the Court erred
in the interpretation of the contract and in refusing the
admission of testimony as to the facts surrounding the execution thereof.
We further submit that the case should be remanded
and the defendant granted a trial by jury, and, in any
event, that the contract should be interpreted to only prohibit the defendant from operating a mortuary or funeral
business in Provo or Utah County south of Provo or in Juab County as a physical establishment, and that the decree
and judgment of the District Court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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